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1 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) regularly reports on 
the number of known BITs and related disputes in its annual reports see most recently its 
World Investment Report (United Nations 2014).
2 On the combination of trade and investment rules in this new type of treaty, see also the 
contributions in Rainer Hofmann, Stephan Schill and Christian Tams (eds.), Preferential 
Trade and Investment Agreements: From Recalibration to Reintegration (Nomos 2013).
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The field of international investment law has caused a lot of controversy in 
recent years. In my view, this is first and foremost due to the higher visibility of 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) or international investment agreements 
(IIAs), as they are alternatively called. This increased visibility is itself a result 
of the high number of investor-state disputes that have become known in 
recent years and the attempt to negotiate a multilateral agreement on invest-
ment (MAI) in the framework of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) in the late 1990s.1
Although these multilateral investment negotiations at the OECD came to a 
standstill in 1998, the parallel increase of bilateral and regional trade negotia-
tions (due to the difficulties in concluding the Doha Round of the World Trade 
Organization [WTO]) has opened the way for the inclusion of investment 
chapters in many (if not most) regional trade (and investment) agreements. 
While the attempted inclusion of investment in the WTO negotiations as one 
of the so-called Singapore Issues in 1996 failed, bilateral negotiations now nor-
mally include a discussion on whether to include investment liberalization and 
protection rules – and most often these negotiations lead to a respective chap-
ter on investment rules in preferential trade and investment agreements.2
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3 See Luke Eric Peterson, ‘Venezuela Surprises the Netherlands with Termination Notice for 
BIT; Treaty Has Been Used by Many Investors to “Route” Investments into Venezuela’, IA 
Reporter, 16 May 2008 <www.iareporter.com/articles/20091001_93> (9 July 2014).
4 See ‘SA Proceeds with Termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties’, Creamer’s Media’s 
Engineering News, 21 October 2013 <www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/sa-proceeds-with 
-termination-of-bilateral-investment-treaties-2013-10-21> (9 July 2014).
5 See ‘Ecuador Terminates BITs with Eight LatAm States’, Global Arbitration Review, 5 November 
2008 <globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/14919/ecuador-terminates-bits-eight-latam 
-states/> (9 July 2014).
6 See ‘Indonesia Terminates BIT’ <www.minbuza.nl/en/key-topics/treaties/news/newsflashes 
-2014/indonesia-terminates-ibo.html> (18 July 2014).
The controversy on international investment law is particularly related to 
the known disputes that result from the inclusion of investor-State dispute 
settlement (ISDS) provisions in these IIAs. While the mechanism as such – in 
particular granting private investors the right to request the establishment of 
an international arbitration tribunal against a sovereign State – has always 
caused controversy, the high number of resulting arbitral awards has high-
lighted for the first time the many challenges that the traditional rules con-
tained in most BITs or IIAs present when States have increased needs for 
capital from foreign investors and at the same time have to safeguard various 
public interests in a quickly changing environment. Many of the investment 
disputes lead to awards that are (partly) in favor of the claimant and thus 
oblige the respondent State to pay damages to a private party. It seems that in 
many cases governments and other State entities have problems to fully envis-
age the consequences of their decisions and are incapable of respecting many 
of the guarantees – at least as interpreted by the respective arbitrators – 
contained in IIAs.
The reaction to the increasing amount of damages to be paid as a result of 
these arbitral awards has been at least threefold:
A first reaction has been to argue that the conclusion of BITs as such is 
detrimental to a State’s sovereignty and its right to regulate in the public inter-
est. As a result some States have terminated certain agreements or refrained 
from concluding (new) agreements. In this category belong the recent termi-
nations of certain of their BITs by Venezuela (e.g., with the Netherlands 
in 2008),3 South Africa (e.g., with Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands 
in 2013),4 Ecuador (e.g., with Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay in 2008),5 or 
the announcement of Indonesia to terminate its investment treaties (e.g., with 
the Netherlands as of 2015).6 A variation has been the termination of the 
participation in the ICSID Convention or the negotiations of BITs without 
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7 See the List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention available via 
<icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID> (14 July 2014).
8 See Jürgen Kurtz, ‘Australia’s Rejection of Investor-State Arbitration’ (2012) 27 ICSID Review-
FILJ 65–86 and the contributions in Michael Waibel et al. (eds.), The Backlash Against 
Investment Arbitration (Kluwer 2010).
9 See UNCTAD, Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies – World Investment Report 2012 
(United Nations 2012) and UNCTAD, Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan – World Investment 
Report 2014 (United Nations 2014).
investor-State dispute settlement. Venezuela denounced the ICSID Convention 
in 2012, Bolivia had done so already in 2007 and Ecuador in 2010.7 Australia and 
the United States have concluded a comprehensive free trade agreement 
(Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement – AUSFTA) in 2004 that 
included an investment chapter, but did not contain an investor-State dispute 
settlement mechanism.8 On the whole this approach remains however rather 
limited and is considered somewhat eccentric.
A second reaction (though much less noted) has been to simply continue 
negotiating BITs and to include the traditional standards together with an 
investor-State dispute settlement mechanism. Yet, this is rather rare as most 
new agreements include at least some modifications.
The third and maybe most common reaction has been to think about adapt-
ing the traditional rules of BITs. States try to continue to negotiate BITs or 
investment chapters in comprehensive trade and investment agreements by 
improving the language and taking into account the results of the general 
debate on the existing rules and the case law as developed by various arbitral 
tribunals.9 It is not always easy to demonstrate which provisions in new invest-
ment agreements are the results of such a reflection as, despite the similarity 
of many provisions in BITs, the exact working has always been subject to 
changes and modifications over time, sometimes even between concurrent 
agreements concluded by the same State with different partner countries.
This Special Issue of JWIT is about this third approach, i.e., to keep negotiat-
ing investment agreements and investment chapters (normally even including 
an investor-State dispute settlement mechanism) but to adapt the rules to the 
needs of the negotiating States in view of the known outcomes of investment 
disputes and the interpretation given therein to the traditional rules on invest-
ment protection. The articles in this Special were originally presented at a 
workshop organized in the framework of the LLM Program in International 
and European Economic and Commercial Law (Master of Advanced Studies) 
at the University of Lausanne (Switzerland) on 24 May 2012. All contributors 
work in the Greater Geneva area or Switzerland and focus on specific aspects 
0002210004.INDD   805 11/15/2014   3:49:35 PM
806 Ziegler
the journal of world investment & trade 15 (2014) 803-808
300854
10 See Bruno Simma and Diane Desierto, ‘Bridging the Public Interest Divide: Committee 
Assistance for Investor-Host State Compliance with the ICESCR’ in D. Hanschel et al. 
(eds.), Mensch und Recht: Festschrift für Eibe Riedel zum 70. Geburtstag (Duncker & 
Humblot, 2013) 49–63 and Caroline Henckels, ‘Balancing Investment Protection and the 
Public Interest’ (2013) 4  Journal of International Dispute Settlement 197–215.
of international economic law in their work. It proved that the relevance of 
sustainable development for negotiating, adjudicating and interpreting BITs 
was a common theme that they all were able to contribute to. The notion of 
sustainable development can herein be seen as comprising a comprehensive 
set of public interests to be safeguarded by law.10
Anne Juliette Bonzon has undertaken a thorough study of the treaty practice 
of one of the States with most BITs in force, namely Switzerland. Switzerland 
is rather representative for the practice of a group of States to which also 
Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium or the United Kingdom belong. They have 
negotiated a large number of agreements in particular with developing coun-
tries after their independence and later also with communist countries during 
the Cold War, and then again with many transition countries and emerging 
economies in the 1990s. Bonzon shows how Switzerland tries to balance tradi-
tional substantive and procedural rights granted to foreign investors with 
social and environmental provisions. Here the notion of sustainable develop-
ment has impregnated many of the traditional provisions though it seems still 
rather uncertain whether the new language in some of Switzerland’s agree-
ments (as this practice is not yet fully uniform) will have an impact on the 
functioning of these agreements and their application by arbitral tribunals.
Anne van Aaken focuses in her contribution on what she calls “smart flexi-
bility clauses” that aim at separating opportunistic behavior by host States 
(that should be sanctioned under international law) from bona fide public 
policy measures (that should not). She draws on economic contract theory as 
a basic framework, and political economy theory for fine-tuning.
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Brian McGarry emphasize the role 
domestic law, in particular constitutional law, can play to improve the out-
come of arbitral decisions regarding investor-State disputes. They claim that 
a better outcome can be reached, for example, by deferring to domestic inter-
pretations of constitutional principles, or to constitutional procedures that 
appear, for example, to protect fair and equitable treatment. An ignorance 
or blindness of arbitral tribunals for the concrete factual and legal situation 
in many States where foreign investment activities and the behavior by the 
authorities have led to disputes is often criticized (though not always demon-
strated), and thus taking into account the domestic rule of law might lead to a 
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11 See Faraz Rojid and Maria del Carmen Vasquez, ‘Investment Law and Poverty: Continuing 
the Debate through UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Develop-
ment’, in this issue, pp. 889–907.
more coherent outcome. This can be understood as taking into account in par-
ticular the social dimension of sustainable development by leading to 
enhanced interaction between the local or domestic level and the interna-
tional sphere.
Faraz Rojid and Maria del Carmen Vasquez build on a presentation given by 
Elisabeth Tuerk at the Lausanne workshop on UNCTAD’s Investment Policy 
Framework for Sustainable Development (IPFSD), which aims to assist policy 
makers in the design of a “new generation” of investment policies “that places 
inclusive growth and sustainable development at the heart of efforts to attract 
and benefit from foreign direct investment.”11 After familiarizing the reader 
with the IPFSD and its relevance to poverty alleviation, they present three 
country-case-studies where foreign investors challenged regulatory measures 
aimed at alleviating poverty and discuss a series of IPFSD-based policy options 
that might help avoid such scenarios. As shown in their article, the UNCTAD 
framework can serve as a point of reference, offering a large number of policy 
options for negotiators to choose the “best-fit combination” for their particular 
country of investment protection and policy flexibility.
Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer focuses in her contribution on the economic 
dimension of sustainable development, i.e., the impact of the legal rules of the 
investment protection regime on poverty and on poverty’s effects on invest-
ment law’s goals. Poverty reduction is however at the interface of the economic 
and social dimension and thus clearly shows the sometimes contradictory 
needs of the poor (and thus most vulnerable) in developing countries. She tries 
to differentiate the different impact that property rights in the form of invest-
ment guarantees have in States that have already achieved a certain level of 
economic development and in least developed countries. She emphasizes also 
the role of NGOs (often through amicus curiae briefs) to influence arbitrators 
who, in their eyes, often are not active enough to interpret BITs in order to 
foster poverty reduction and use the agreements in the interest of the people 
directly affected by investment activities.
Tarcisio Gazzini, finally, assesses how States can take full advantage of 
investment treaties as vehicles for economic development without compro-
mising on the protection of the environment, labour standard and human 
rights. He also provides a tentative taxonomy of the different treaty clauses 
and techniques that may contribute to create a stable and predictable legal 
framework for foreign investment that is also respectful of the various private 
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12 See Ulrich Beyerlin, ‘The Concept of Sustainable Development’ in R. Wolfrum (ed.), 
Enforcing Environmental Standards: Economic Mechanisms as Viable Means? (Springer 
1996) 95–121 and Lorenzo Cotula and Kyla Tienhaara, ‘Reconfiguring Investment Contracts 
to Promote Sustainable Development’ in K. Sauvant (ed.), Yearbook on International 
Investment Law & Policy 2011/12 (2013) 281–310.
13 See, e.g., United Nations/Environment Programme/Economics and Trade Unit, 
Introduction to Capacity Building for Environment, Trade and Sustainable Development 
(UNEP 2004), or, very early, Andreas R. Ziegler, Trade and Environment in the European 
Community (OUP 1996) and Julio García Burgués, ‘Trade and Environment in the WTO’ 
(1997) 6 Rev. European Community & Int’l Envt’l L. 163–170.
and public interests involved. He gives a broad overview of the techniques cur-
rently discussed and used to modify the traditional language of BITs without 
giving up the system and tested principles as such. He analyzes in particular 
the published model agreements by certain important players and the recent 
treaty practice of a wide variety of States. Here again, it becomes clear that 
many of the modifications are reactions to recent outcomes of specific arbitra-
tions and are not always entirely tested as to what they mean for the overall 
coherence and balance of IIAs.
As one can see from all of these contributions the notion of sustainable 
development itself sometimes lacks the precision that might be useful to get 
proper guidance on how to reform existing BITs and negotiate better BITs in 
the future.12 At the same time, one can certainly no longer ignore it when nego-
tiating IIAs and applying international investment law. Similarly to what has 
happened earlier in the area of trade,13 we now face a rebalancing of existing 
models in order to better integrate non-investment and investment policies. 
Changes related to sustainable development are, however, often mixed with 
modifications which have different rationales (such as the exact scope of the 
most-favored-nation clause or transparency provisions). On the whole, this 
certainly leads to more detailed agreements, which automatically makes them 
more complicated and increases the risk of inconsistencies within the text. 
Nevertheless, one must acknowledge that most of these modifications are 
immediate reactions to specific problems encountered in the past that hope-
fully can be solved through better provisions. We all know that new provisions 
will probably create new problems and lead to the discovery of more problems 
in other provisions that have not yet been challenged. The contributions in this 
volume are a modest attempt to contribute to the search for better BITs.
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